000 01417nam a2200241Ia 4500
999 _c83
_d83
003 DE-boiza
005 20190919105634.0
008 190909
020 _a0-19-829332-1
040 _cIZA
100 _aSaint-Paul, Gilles
_9219
245 4 _aThe Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions
260 _c2000
_bOxford University Press,
_aOxford et al.,
300 _a280 pages
340 _hJ2 191
520 _aMost economists think that unemployment is high in Europe because of rigid labour market institutions such as minimum wages, unemployment benefits, and employment protection. The book develops a theory of labour market institutions as the outcome of the political process. A central hypothesis is that they will be chiefly determined by the interests of employed workers with intermediate skill levels. We show that redistributive conflict between these workers and more skilled workers may lead to an outcome where a set of rigid institutions arise. We analyse why reform may be difficult because of status‐quo bias, and discuss how it may nevertheless be implemented by choosing an appropriate design or timing for the reform.
650 _aArbeitsmarktpolitik
_9221
653 _aEconomicPolicy
653 _aPoliticalScience
653 _aPublicPolicy
856 _uhttps://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198293321.001.0001/acprof-9780198293323
_yPublisher's website
942 _cBO
_2z