000			01793nam a2200277Ia 4500
999			_c1478 _d1478
003			DE-boiza
005			20200106145229.0
008			191008
020			_a978-1-10-769512-2
040			_cIZA
100			_aHausman, Daniel M. _94117
245		0	_aPreference, Value, Choice, and Welfare
260			_c2011 _bCambridge University Press, _aCambridge et al.,
300			_a168 pages
340			_hD7 35
520			_aThis book is about preferences, principally as they figure in economics. It also explores their uses in everyday language and action, how they are understood in psychology and how they figure in philosophical reflection on action and morality. The book clarifies and for the most part defends the way in which economists invoke preferences to explain, predict and assess behavior and outcomes. Hausman argues, however, that the predictions and explanations economists offer rely on theories of preference formation that are in need of further development, and he criticizes attempts to define welfare in terms of preferences and to define preferences in terms of choices or self-interest. The analysis clarifies the relations between rational choice theory and philosophical accounts of human action. The book also assembles the materials out of which models of preference formation and modification can be constructed, and it comments on how reason and emotion shape preferences.
650			_adecision making _9962
650			_apreference _94118
650			_avalue _96079
650			_achoice _96056
650			_aeconomics _9488
650			_awelfare _96080
650			_awell-being _95296
856			_uhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/books/preference-value-choice-and-welfare/1406E7726CE93F4F4E06D752BF4584A2#fndtn-information _yPublisher's website
942			_cBO _2ddc