000			02112nam a2200313Ia 4500
999			_c106 _d106
003			DE-boiza
005			20230526104721.0
008			190909
020			_a0-19-927884-9
040			_cIZA
100			_aGibson, Clark C. _9301
100			_aAndersson, Krister _9302
100			_a Ostrom, Elinor _9303
100			_aShivakumar, Sujai _9304
245		4	_aThe Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid
260			_c2005 _bClarendon Press, _aLondon,
300			_a264 pages
340			_hO1 38
520			_aWhat’s wrong with development aid? It is argued that much of aid’s failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. These institutions govern the complex relationships between the main actors in the aid delivery system, and often generate a series of perverse incentives that promote inefficient and unsustainable outcomes. The theoretical insights of the new institutional economics are applied to several settings. First, the institutions of Sida, the Swedish aid agency, is investigated to analyze how that aid agency’s institutions can produce incentives inimical to desired outcomes, contrary to the desires of its own staff. Second, cases from India, a country with low aid dependence, and Zambia, a country with high aid dependence, are used to explore how institutions on the ground in recipient countries might also mediate the effectiveness of aid. Suggestions are offered on how to improve aid’s effectiveness. These include how to structure evaluations in order to improve outcomes, how to employ agency staff to gain from their on-the-ground experience, and how to engage stakeholders as “owners” in the design, resource mobilization, learning, and evaluation process of development assistance programs.
650			_adevelopment aid _9306
651			_aIndia _9308
651			_aZambia _9309
653			_adevelopment assistance
653			_adevelopment polics
653			_ainstitutional analysis
653			_asustainability
856			_uhttps://academic.oup.com/book/8966 _ydetails (Oxford University Press)
942			_cBO _2ddc