| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
02139nam a2200313Ia 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
|---|
| control field |
DE-boiza |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
|---|
| control field |
20200120135306.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
191008 |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
|---|
| International Standard Book Number |
0-262-66131-4 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
|---|
| Transcribing agency |
IZA |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Persson, Torsten |
| 9 (RLIN) |
3574 |
|
|---|
| Personal name |
Tabellini, Guido |
| 9 (RLIN) |
6619 |
| 245 #0 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
|---|
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2002 |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. |
MIT Press, |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. |
Cambridge, Mass., |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
533 pages |
| 340 ## - PHYSICAL MEDIUM |
|---|
| Location within medium |
D7 7 |
| 440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
|---|
| Title |
Zeuthen Lecture Book Series |
| 9 (RLIN) |
6620 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
<br/><br/>What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis.<br/><br/>Combining the best of three separate traditions—the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science—Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.<br/> |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
political economics |
| 9 (RLIN) |
3575 |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
rational choice |
| 9 (RLIN) |
6464 |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
macroeconomics |
| 9 (RLIN) |
314 |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
preferences |
| 9 (RLIN) |
6591 |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
redistribution |
| 9 (RLIN) |
6520 |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
public goods |
| 9 (RLIN) |
5507 |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
taxation |
| 9 (RLIN) |
1905 |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
political institutions |
| 9 (RLIN) |
6621 |
| 856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
|---|
| Uniform Resource Identifier |
<a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/political-economics">https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/political-economics</a> |
| Link text |
Publisher's website |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Koha item type |
Monography |
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
|
